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Individuals with autism spectrum disorder and those with autistic tendencies in non-clinical 
groups are thought to have a perceptual style privileging local details over global integration. 
We used thirteen illusions to investigate this perceptual style in typically developing adults 
with various levels of autistic traits. Illusory susceptibility was entered into a principal-
component analysis. Only one factor, consisting of the Shepard's tabletops and Square-
diamond illusions, was found to have reduced susceptibility as a function of autistic traits. 
Given that only two illusions were affected and that these illusions depend mostly on the 
processing of within-object relational properties, we conclude there is something distinct 
about autistic-like perceptual functioning but not in ways predicted by a preference of local 
over global elements. 
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Introduction 
Enhanced abilities in discriminating details have been documented in individuals with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD). These reports consist of superior performance in children and 
adults with ASD on the embedded figures task and on tasks that require fine-grained visual 
searches (Shah & Frith, 1983; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Bölte, Holtmann, Poustka, 
Scheurich, & Schmidt, 2007). These observations, together with other lines of evidence, led 
Frith to propose the Weak Central Coherence theory of autism (Frith, 2003); central 
coherence being defined as: “the tendency to process incoming information in its context — 
that is, pulling information together for higher-level meaning” (Happé, 1999; p. 217). 
Originally, the theory proposed that weak central coherence was the cause of perceptual 
differences in ASD (Frith & Happé, 1994). Namely, perceptual differences in ASD were the 
result of a deficit in processing the global elements of a scene. The theory was later revised to 
propose instead that weak central coherence pertains to a style, as opposed to a deficit, in 
which the local elements of a scene are preferred over its global elements (Happé & Frith, 
2006). 
An alternative account, the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory, proposes that 
persons with ASD have an enhanced processing of sensory input, which biases them towards 
the local elements of a scene (Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, 
& Burack, 2006). The theory is effectively the converse of the original Weak Central 
Coherence theory. Rather than reduced global processing leading to an enhanced ability in 
processing local elements, the theory proposes that individuals with ASD rely and make 
greater use of their enhanced sensory abilities for local processing. For over ten years, both 
theories dominated perceptual research in autism and attempted to explain a perceptual style 
in ASD that privileges local details over global integration.  
A different idea has started to gain considerable attention. This idea is based on old 
notions regarding the importance of experience in typical visual perception that was first put 
forth by Hermann von Helmholtz (1867) and then elaborated and championed by Richard 
Gregory (1980). According to this view, what we experience as sight is the result of an active 
process of formulating and testing hypotheses about the world around us. It then follows that 
experiences, or priors, are important in shaping visual perception.  
Pellicano & Burr (2012) proposed that the use of priors in persons with ASD is 
attenuated relative to typically developing people and therefore the active process of 
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formulating and testing hypotheses about the world is more immune to suggestion, which 
results in a tendency to perceive the world more objectively, and a desire to be in more 
familiar settings. Similar accounts have been developed over the last few years by other 
researchers (e.g., Davis & Plaisted-Grant, 2015; Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; van Boxtel 
& Lu, 2013; Van de Cruys et al., 2014). 
The above theories attempt to provide mechanistic explanations as to why people with 
ASD have a perceptual bias for local elements in a scene. Yet, does this cause them to see the 
world more objectively? One way to verify this notion is to assess the degree to which a 
person’s perception is immune to previous hypotheses, which can be achieved using optical 
illusions. Optical illusions rely on mechanisms that are usually helpful for seeing the world in 
a predictable manner but trick us given the right set of circumstances, correcting where a 
correction is not necessary. A perceptual bias for local elements would predict that persons 
with ASD would be less susceptible to optical illusions. Yet, a recent meta-analysis of the 
published corpus revealed that there have been more reports of illusory susceptibility being 
equal to or greater in persons with ASD relative to control participants than reports of 
reduced illusory susceptibility in ASD (Van der Hallen, Evers, Brewaeys, Van den Noortgate, 
& Wagemans, 2015), providing more evidence to counter than support a perceptual bias for 
favouring local elements and seeing the world more objectively. To illustrate some of these 
inconsistencies, both Happé (1996) and Bölte et al. (2007) reported a resistance to optical 
illusions in persons with ASD relative to comparison groups whereas Hoy, Hatton, & Hare 
(2004) as well as Ropar & Mitchell (1999, 2001) concluded that persons with ASD are just as 
susceptible to optical illusions as typically developing comparison groups.  
The likely presence of a number of confounding factors in earlier work might explain 
these inconsistencies (Chouinard, Noulty, Sperandio, & Landry, 2013; Walter, Dassonville, 
& Bochsler, 2009). Attention, preservative behaviours, anxiety, and understanding task 
instructions are difficult to control and may not have been appropriately matched in a number 
of earlier studies of optical illusions in ASD. Compounding this problem, many studies used 
suboptimal paradigms for reporting perception in an attempt to mitigate these issues (i.e., 
categorical verbal judgements to illusions; Bölte et al., 2007; Happé, 1996; Hoy et al., 2004), 
yielding greater noise and lower sensitivity in their measures (Chouinard et al., 2013). Co-
morbid disorders and neural aetiology leading to ASD may have also differed across earlier 
studies. In addition, susceptibility to optical illusions is influenced by both chronological and 
mental ages yet most studies match their control group with their ASD group based on either 
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mental or chronological age. In doing so, various facets of cognitive development 
underpinning task performance could have been missed (Burack, Iarocci, Flanagan, & 
Bowler, 2004). Furthermore, differences in the choice of optical illusions could have yielded 
inconsistencies across different age groups given that susceptibility to some optical illusions 
matures earlier than others (Coren & Porac, 1978). 
An alternative approach to between-group designs that can circumvent many of these 
extraneous variables is to examine autistic characteristics within the typically developing 
population. Behavioural similarities between autism probands and unaffected family 
members have long been recognised (Kanner, 1943) and a surge of more recent and genetic 
studies have documented the presence of subclinical autistic traits in relatives of individuals 
with ASD (Bailey et al., 1995; Happe, Briskman, & Frith, 2001; Piven, 2001; Sucksmith, 
Roth, & Hoekstra, 2011). Gaugler et al. (2014) reported that the majority of genetic liability 
for ASD is attributed to common inherited variances with this genetic variability extending 
well beyond family members and being widely distributed throughout the general population. 
These observations led to the development of the autism spectrum quotient (AQ) 
questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), which was 
developed to quantify the normal spectrum of subclinical autistic behaviours in the general 
population. The AQ has been validated on a number of occasions in large samples of typical 
individuals without any formal diagnosis of ASD (N > 600) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Hurst, 
Nelson-Gray, Mitchell, & Kwapil, 2007).  
Behavioural investigations of unaffected family members and undergraduate samples 
with higher AQ scores often show similar patterns in perceptual and cognitive abilities, such 
as enhanced detail-focused processing (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Bayliss & Tipper, 
2005; Bölte & Poustka, 2006), reduced language abilities (Ruser et al., 2007; Whitehouse, 
Barry, & Bishop, 2007), and difficulties in social cognition (Hudson, Nijboer, & Jellema, 
2012; Palermo, Pasqualetti, Barbati, Intelligente, & Rossini, 2006). Thus, relating AQ to 
performance on perceptual and cognitive tasks not only provides insight into individual 
differences in the general population but can also allow opportunities to step back and re-
examine discrepant issues that emerge in autism research as a result of confounding factors 
that are difficult to control. 
Similarly, the empathy (EQ) and systemising (SQ) quotient questionnaires were also 
devised to quantify the degree of autistic traits in the general population (Baron-Cohen, 
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Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & Wheelwright, 2003; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) 
and have been validated in large samples of typically developing individuals (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2014; Groen, Fuermaier, Den Heijer, Tucha, & Althaus, 2015; Wheelwright et al., 2006). 
Specifically, the former measures the degree to which a person empathises, which is reduced 
in ASD, and the latter measures the degree to which a person is interested in the analysis and 
construction of systems, which is enhanced in ASD. The EQ and SQ, especially in 
combination, offer a slightly more nuanced quantification of autistic traits in non-clinical 
samples. 
Two earlier investigations examined relationships between autistic traits and 
susceptibility to optical illusions in typical populations (Chouinard et al., 2013; Walter et al., 
2009). Specifically, Walter et al. (2009) showed that susceptibility to the rod-and-frame, 
Roelofs, Ponzo, and Poggendorf illusions but not to the Induced motion, Zöllner, Ebbinghaus, 
and Müller-Lyer illusion diminished with autistic traits while Chouinard et al. (2013) showed 
that susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer but not to the Ebbinghaus and Ponzo illusions 
diminished with autistic traits. The take home message from both studies is that susceptibility 
to only a subset of illusions correlated with autistic traits and that illusion susceptibility does 
not rely on a singular cognitive construct but is rather mediated by different mechanisms of 
global processing, some of which may or may not be affected by autistic characteristics. If 
this notion is correct, this would undermine the prevailing view that there is a perceptual style 
in ASD that privileges local details over global integration.  
Furthermore, local elements are more salient in some illusions than in others, allowing 
specific prediction as to which illusions may be more affected by a perceptual style of local 
processing. At one extreme, there are illusions that are strongly characterised by between-
object relational properties with local elements that are clearly demarked and / or physically 
detached from each other (e.g., the Delboeuf illusion in Fig. 1a; the Ebbinghaus illusion in 
Fig. 1b; the Ehrenstien illusion in Fig. 1c; the Ponzo illusion in Fig. 1j; see also Ben-Shalom 
& Ganel, 2012). At the other extreme, there are illusions that are strongly characterised by 
within-object relational properties in which the local elements are not perceptually 
distinguishable and not processed independently from each other (e.g., the Shepard’s 
tabletops illusion in Fig. 1l; the Square-diamond illusion in Fig. 1m; see Ganel & Goodale, 
2003; Ben-Shalom & Ganel, 2012). It then follows that if there is a perceptual style for local 
processing then reduced susceptibility is more likely to be seen in the former than the latter 
class of illusions. 
7 
 
In the present investigation, we provide a much more thorough investigation than 
previous studies by comparing a wider range of illusions with between-object and within-
object relational properties. In addition, we include a number of well-known illusions that 
have never been correlated before with autistic traits, such as the Delboeuf (Fig. 1a), 
Ehrenstein (Fig. 1c), Fick (Fig. 1d; a.k.a. the Hat or vertical-horizontal line illusion), 
Helmholtz square (Fig. 1e), Jastrow (Fig. 1f), Oppel-Kundt (Fig. 1h), Sander’s parallegram 
(Fig. 1k), Shepard’s tabletops (Fig. 1l), and the Square-diamond (Fig. 1m) illusions. We also 
incorporated for the first time a number of control tasks for measuring visual acuity and 
abilities to discriminate between luminance, shape, orientation, and size (Fig. 1n-r). These 
measures allowed us to identify participants who may have had problems with low-level 
vision, or basic task instruction comprehension, and remove them from the data set in an 
objective manner. These additional measurements also allowed us to verify that any reduced 
susceptibility to optical illusions could relate to processes related to global integration as 
opposed to systematic differences in low-level vision. 
We had two competing hypotheses. The first, on the basis of the prevailing view that 
there is a perceptual style in ASD that privileges local details over global integration, we 
predict that susceptibility across most illusions, particularly those with strong between-object 
relational properties, would diminish as a function of autistic traits. The second, on the basis 
that perceptual functioning in ASD might relate instead to specific types of global integration, 
we predict that some but not all illusions would diminish as a function of autistic traits. For 
the latter hypothesis, our specific prediction was that illusions with stronger within-object 
relational properties might be more affected by autistic traits. 
 
Methods 
Participants performed thirteen illusion tasks and five control tasks to measure abilities in 
perceptual discrimination.  The order of trials per task condition was randomly generated and 
intermixed within one omnibus block of trials. There were 4 trials per task condition for an 
overall total of 72 trials. The experiment took approximately twenty minutes to complete.  
 
Participants 
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One hundred and fifty-three (79 males, age range 18-57, mean = 23.4) right-handed adults 
participated in the experiment. Four male participants were excluded on the basis of 
perceptual discrimination scores exceeding ±3 SD from the mean on one or more control 
tasks and an additional nine females and nine males were excluded on the basis of 
susceptibility index scores exceeding ±3 SD from the mean on one or more of the illusions 
tasks. Removing these outliers helped to systematically remove both noise from the data that 
would reflect various aspects of non-compliance and non-reported problems in low-level 
vision such as acuity. This resulted in a final sample size of 131. All participants were high-
functioning members of one of three university communities and reported to have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. For screening purposes, we asked all potential participants 
whether or not they had been diagnosed with ASD or any other neurological or psychiatric 
condition, and excluded those who answered yes. All participants provided informed written 
consent and all procedures were approved by the local research ethics boards. 
 
Autistic trait questionnaires 
Participants completed in-house computerised versions of the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), 
EQ (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004), and SQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003). In brief, the 
AQ contained 50 questions that consisted of the following subscales: Social Skill, Attention 
Switching, Attention to Detail, Imagination, and Communication. For each question, 
participants read a statement and selected the degree to which the statement best described 
them. Their response options were: “strongly agree”, “slightly agree”, “slightly disagree”, 
and “strongly disagree”. Items were scored in the standard manner as described in the 
original paper (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Namely, each item was scored as either 0 or 1. A 
score of 0 was given when the participant did not provide a response characteristic of ASD 
either slightly or strongly while a score of 1 was given when the participant did provide a 
response characteristic of ASD either slightly or strongly. Total scores could range between 0 
and 50 with higher scores indicating higher degrees of autistic traits.  
The EQ and SQ each contained 60 items, 20 of which were distractor items. Like the 
AQ, participants selected the degree to which a statement best described them by selecting 
one of the same four answers, and items were scored in the standard manner as described in 
the original papers (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Namely, 
items were scored as 0 for responses not corresponding to ASD, 1 for answering “slightly” to 
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a response characteristic of ASD, or 2 for answering “strongly” to a response characteristic of 
ASD. Total scores could range between 0 and 80. Lower scores on the EQ and higher scores 
on the SQ indicated greater levels of autistic characteristics. All participants completed the 
AQ while 139 participants completed the EQ and 141 participants completed the SQ. Data 
from participants with a missing questionnaire were still used to correlate their susceptibility 
on illusions with the questionnaires they did complete. 
 
General procedures for the optical illusion tasks 
We examined susceptibility to thirteen optical illusions. The illusions consisted of the 
Delboeuf, Ebbinghaus, Ehrenstein, Fick, Helmholz square, Jastrow, Müller-lyer, Oppel-
Kuntz, Ponzo, Poggendorf, Shepard’s tabletops, Sander’s parallelogram, and Square-diamond 
illusions. Each illusion is shown in Fig. 1.  
For each trial, participants had to adjust a comparison stimulus (or a particular part of 
the optical illusion display designated as the comparison feature) to appear the same along a 
physical dimension as a standard stimulus (or a particular part of the optical illusion display 
designated as the standard feature) by pressing “Decrease” and “Increase” buttons displayed 
on the bottom-right and bottom-centre of the computer screen. Participants pressed a “Done” 
button displayed on the bottom-left of the computer screen when they felt they had matched 
the comparison stimulus to the standard stimulus. Participants were given as much time as 
they needed to complete each trial. The participant’s final adjustment was measured in pixels. 
Participants kept their head in a chin rest during task performance. 
All illusions were presented over a black background in Action Script (Adobe 
Systems, San Jose, CA). The programs were presented in Flash player (Adobe Systems, San 
Jose, CA) on a computer monitor with an aspect ratio of 16:9. Visual presentation was 
maximised to full screen with the width of presentation subtending a visual angle of 22.4 
degrees. We explicitly instructed participants to judge the perceived size of the standard 
stimulus while refraining from using any other strategies that might help them with the task 
(e.g., imagining a grid on the computer screen, estimating the stimuli with their fingers, etc.). 
For each participant, the order of the trials was generated randomly. The comparison stimulus 
was initially presented either 20 to 50% smaller or 20 to 50% bigger than the standard 
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stimulus. Four trials, each representing one of 4 different starting combinations, were 
presented per illusion.  
 
Delboeuf illusion. The illusion consisted of two yellow circles each surrounded by 
contextual rings in magenta (Fig. 1a). The contextual circle on the right was always 
physically larger than the one on the left. The apparent size of the yellow circle on the right 
was typically larger than the one on the left when both had the same size. One of the yellow 
circles was designated as the standard while the other was designated as the comparison 
stimulus. The standard always remained 40 pixels in diameter. The participant’s task was to 
adjust the size of the comparison stimulus to match the standard. 
 
Ebbinghaus illusion. The task was identical to the Delboeuf illusion except that the 
contextual elements consisted of either big or small magenta circles arranged as rings 
surrounding the yellow circles (Fig. 1b). The ring of big circles was always presented on the 
left while the ring of small circles was always presented on the right.  
 
Ehrenstein illusion. The illusion consisted of a yellow outline of a four-sided shape over a 
contextual background of nineteen magenta lines originating from the right and converging 
towards the left of the display (Fig. 1c). When the four sides of the shape were identical and 
formed a square, the left edge typically appeared longer than the right. The comparison and 
standard features consisted of the vertical edges of the four-sided shape. The standard 
remained stationary with a length of 100 pixels. The participant’s task was to adjust the 
length of the comparison stimulus so that the overall shape of the yellow outline formed a 
square in appearance. 
 
Fick illusion. The illusion consisted of a yellow upside-down letter T (Fig. 1d). The vertical 
line of the T typically appeared longer than the overall length of its horizontal line when both 
were physically the same length. One of the lines was designated as the standard while the 
other was designated as the comparison stimulus. The standard was 100 pixels in length and 
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did not change. The participant’s task was to adjust the length of the comparison stimulus to 
match the standard. 
 
Helmholtz square illusion. The illusion consisted of eleven yellow horizontal lines running 
parallel to each other (Fig. 1e). When the overall arrangement of the lines physically formed 
a square, its height typically appeared larger than its width. The comparison and standard 
features consisted of the overall height and overall width, or vice versa. The standard was 
always presented 100 pixels in size. The participant’s task was to adjust the length of the 
comparison feature so that the overall shape of the stimulus looked like a square. 
 
Jastrow illusion. The illusion consisted of two yellow “Pac-Man” shapes presented one on 
top of the other, which were slightly misaligned and offset in their orientation (Fig. 1f). The 
apparent size of the bottom stimulus was typically larger than the one on top. The top and 
bottom shapes were designated as the comparison and standard stimuli, or vice versa. The 
two widest points of the standard remained stationary at 190 pixels in distance. The 
participant’s task was to adjust the size of the comparison stimulus so that it matched the 
standard. 
 
Müller-Lyer illusion. The illusion consisted of two horizontal yellow lines with white 
arrowheads on either end (Fig. 1g). Each line differed with respect to the direction of the 
arrowheads. The line on the left was always presented with the arrowheads pointing inward 
while the line on the right was always presented with the arrowheads pointing outward. When 
both lines were physically the same length, the line on the left typically appeared longer than 
the one on the right. One of the lines was designated as the comparison stimulus while the 
other was designated as the standard, the latter remaining 100 pixels in length while the 
participant adjusted the length of the former. 
 
Oppel Kundt illusion. The illusion consisted of seventeen short vertical yellow lines which 
were presented parallel to each other (Fig. 1h). The apparent distance between the 1st and 
16th line was typically greater than the apparent distance between the 16th and 17th lines 
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when both distances were physically equal. The participants’ task was to either match the 
former to the latter, or vice versa. The standard distance was always 150 pixels. 
 
Poggendorf illusion. The illusion consisted of a yellow transversal line whose middle 
portion was occluded by a magenta rectangle (Fig. 1i). This configuration typically produced 
the illusion of two yellow transversal lines being displaced from each other. One of the ends 
was designated as the standard while the other was designated as the comparison feature, 
which was presented initially 12 pixels higher or lower along the vertical axis from where 
one long transversal line would pass through. The participant’s task was to align the 
comparison stimulus to the standard. 
 
Ponzo illusion. The illusion consisted of two yellow horizontal bars that were presented one 
over the other. The bars appeared over a contextual background of four vertical magenta lines 
converging into the background (Fig. 1j). The bar on top typically appeared longer than the 
one at the bottom when both were the same size. One of the bars was designated as the 
standard while the other was designated as the comparison stimulus. The participant’s task 
was to adjust the length of the comparison stimulus to match the standard, which remained 
fixed at 100 pixels. 
 
Sander’s parallelogram. The illusion consisted of yellow diagonal lines inside two 
parallelograms outlined in magenta (Fig. 1k). The length of the diagonal line bisecting the 
larger parallelogram to the left typically appeared longer than the one bisecting the smaller 
parallelogram to the right when both had the same physical length. One of the diagonal lines 
was designated as the standard while the other was designated as the comparison stimulus. 
The participant’s task was to adjust the length of the comparison stimulus to match the 
standard, which remained fixed at 141 pixels. 
 
Shepard’s tabletops illusion. The illusion consisted of two yellow parallelograms (Fig. 1l). 
The parallelogram on the left was presented vertically while the one on the right was 
presented horizontally. One of the parallelograms was designated as the standard while the 
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other was designated as the comparison stimulus. The length of both parallelograms remained 
fixed at 180 pixels. The width of the standard remained fixed at 75 pixels while the width of 
the comparison stimulus was adjusted by the participants so that it matched the standard. The 
apparent width of the parallelogram on the left was typically smaller than the one on the right 
when both were physically identical. 
 
Square-diamond illusion. The illusion consisted of two yellow squares (Fig. 1m). The 
square on the right was rotated 45 degrees. The square oriented 45 degrees typically appeared 
larger than the other when both were the same physical size. One of the squares was 
designated as the standard, which remained fixed at 120 pixels in length, while the other was 
designated as the comparison stimulus, which the participant adjusted. 
 
General procedures for the control tasks 
We also had participants perform five control tasks. For each trial, participants had to adjust a 
comparison stimulus to appear physically the same as a standard stimulus along a particular 
physical dimension. This was accomplished in the same manner as in the illusion tasks. 
Participants were presented with the same two buttons at the bottom of the computer screen 
to manually adjust the comparison stimulus and they were also presented with a “Done” 
button to indicate when they felt they had matched the comparison stimulus to the standard. 
The order of the trials was generated randomly and intermixed among the illusion trials. The 
comparison stimulus was initially presented either 50 % smaller or 50 % bigger than the 
standard. Four trials, each representing one of four different starting combinations, were 
carried out per control task. All displays had a black background. 
 
Size matching control task. The task assessed abilities in size discrimination. The display 
consisted of two yellow squares (Fig. 1n). One of the squares was designated as the standard, 
which remained fixed at 120 pixels in length, while the other was designated as the 
comparison stimulus, which the participant adjusted. Scores were obtained by calculating the 
absolute difference in pixels between the fixed length of the standard and the adjusted length 
of the comparison stimulus. 
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Shape matching control task. The task assessed abilities in shape discrimination. The 
display consisted of two yellow four-sided shapes (Fig. 1o). One was a rectangle, which was 
designated as the comparison stimulus, and the other was a square, which was designated as 
the standard. The height and width of the standard remained fixed at 120 pixels. The width of 
the comparison remained fixed at 120 pixels while the height was adjusted by the participants 
so that it matched the standard. Scores were obtained by calculating the absolute difference in 
pixels between the fixed height of the standard and the adjusted height of the comparison 
stimulus. 
 
Orientation matching control task. The task assessed abilities in orientation discrimination. 
The display consisted of two dials (Fig. 1p). One dial, which served as the standard, was 
presented diagonally and the other, which served as the comparison stimulus, was initially 
oriented either vertically or horizontally. The dials were 50 pixels long and 10 pixels wide. 
The participant’s task was to adjust the orientation of the comparison stimulus so that it 
matched the standard. Scores were obtained by calculating the absolute difference in degrees 
between the fixed angle of the standard and the adjusted angle of the comparison stimulus. 
 
Alignment matching control task. The task assessed abilities in Verner acuity. The display 
consisted of two horizontal yellow lines passing perpendicularly through the long axis of a 
rectangle outlined in magenta, which was presented in the upright position (Fig. 1q). One of 
the yellow lines served as the standard while the other served as the comparison, which was 
presented initially 57 pixels lower or higher than the standard. The participant’s task was to 
align the comparison stimulus to match the standard. Scores were obtained by calculating the 
absolute difference in pixels between the fixed vertical position of the standard and the 
adjusted vertical position of the comparison stimulus. 
 
Luminance matching control task. The task assessed abilities in detecting luminance 
contrast. The display consisted of two grey squares (Fig. 1r). One of them had an RGB value 
of [128, 128, 128]. This square was the standard. The other, which served as the comparison 
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stimulus, was presented with an initial RGB value of either [64, 64, 64] or [192, 192, 192]. 
Both squares were 110 pixels wide. The participant’s task was to adjust the luminance of the 
comparison stimulus to match the standard. Scores were obtained by calculating the absolute 
difference in RGB value between the fixed luminance of the standard and the adjusted 
luminance of the comparison stimulus. 
 
Statistical analyses  
Statistical analyses were carried out using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS; IBM Corporation; Armonk, New York, USA). Unless specified otherwise, all 
reported p values were based on two-tailed criteria and corrected for multiple comparisons 
using the Bonferroni method (i.e. pcorr = puncorr × number of comparisons made) (Dunn, 1961). 
Skewness and kurtosis tests were performed to check for normality in the distribution of 
scores for AQ, EQ, and SQ.  
Data from the illusion tasks were normalised given that it is well known that some 
illusions are stronger than others. It then follows that calculating a normalised index of 
susceptibility for each one allows for more meaningful comparisons between them, which is 
why normalisation approaches have become frequently used in studies of optical illusions 
(Chouinard et al., 2013; Schwarzkopf et al., 2011). Normalised indices of susceptibility to 
each illusion were calculated as follows: [(Perceived Size in Configuration A – Perceived 
Size in Configuration B) / (Perceived Size in Configuration A + Perceived Size in 
Configuration B); configuration A denoting the condition one would expect to see greater 
judgements in perceived size]. For each illusion, a one-sample t-test against zero was 
performed and a Cohen’s d effect size score was calculated.  
A principal component analysis was then carried out on these susceptibility scores 
using Varimax rotation. A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure was calculated; a value of 
0.5 and above was considered as an appropriate measure of sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 
1974). Components with an Eigenvalue greater than 1.0 were retained for the reported final 
solution. The reported final solution yielded a five factor solution (see Results). We used a 
threshold loading of 0.4 for the purposes of matching a particular illusion to a particular 
component. A regression score predicting each composite factor from the principle 
components analysis was calculated, resulting in five regression scores per individual. These 
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regression scores were then correlated with each of the quotient scores (i.e. AQ, EQ, and SQ), 
as well as between each of the AQ subscales. We also performed multiple regression analyses 
to determine whether or not gender contributed to any significant correlations. In addition, we 
calculated average scores for each participant’s performance on each of the control tasks and 
calculated Pearson correlation coefficients r between these scores and each of the quotient 
scores (i.e. AQ, EQ, and SQ), as well as between the various components obtained from the 
principal component analysis.  
 
Additional tests 
In addition to the regression-based approach described in the previous section, we also used a 
median-split approach to compare susceptibility scores on each of the different components 
between participants with low versus high scores on the AQ, EQ, and SQ. Also, an additional 
experiment was performed to examine whether or not participants became better at judging 
the physical properties of a stimulus as a function of trial number. The methods and results 
for these additional tests are described in the Supplementary Materials. 
 
 
Results 
 
Illusion susceptibility 
Participants perceived the standard differently in the expected direction 97.35% of the time 
(i.e., susceptibly scores were positive in 97.35% of cases). One-sample t tests against zero 
showed illusory effects for all illusions (all p < 0.001) with effect sizes (Cohen’s d) ranging 
between 0.19 (Square-diamond illusion) and 0.44 (Shepard’s tabletops illusion) (Table 1).  
 
Distributions of quotient scores 
The AQ scores were normally distributed with a range of 2 to 43 (M = 16.35, SD = 7.19, 
Skewness: z = 0.75, Kurtosis: z = 1.45; Fig. 2a). The EQ scores were also normally 
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distributed with a range of 5 to 71 (M = 43.92, SD = 13.32, Skewness: z = -0.55, Kurtosis: z = 
0.39; Fig. 2b). Likewise, the SQ scores were normally distributed with a range of 2 to 63 (M 
= 25.28, SD = 13.02, Skewness: z = 0.62, Kurtosis: z = -0.16; Fig. 2c). The quotient scores 
were inter-correlated with each other (all p < .0001). We performed independent samples t-
tests to test for the effects of gender. These tests revealed that AQ scores did not differ 
between males and females (mean difference: 1.1 points, t(129) = .86, p = 1) while higher EQ 
scores were present in the females relative to the males (mean difference: 7.6 points, t(119) = -
3.23, p = .005) and higher SQ scores were present in the males relative to the females (mean 
difference: 9.9 points, t(121) = 4.51, p < .001).  
 
Principal component analysis 
The principal component analysis returned a factor solution with five factors that accounted 
for 57.34% of the total variance (Table 2). The resulting KMO was 0.61. The first component 
(A) was driven mainly by susceptibilities to the Ehrenstein, Jastrow, Ponzo, and Sander’s 
Parallelogram illusions, which accounted for 14.64% of the total variance. The second 
component (B) was driven mainly by susceptibilities to the Fick, Helmholz, and Müller-Lyer 
illusions, which accounted for 11.74% of the total variance. The third component (C) was 
driven mainly by susceptibilities to the Delbeuf and Ebbinghaus illusions, which accounted 
for 11.56% of the total variance. The fourth component (D) was driven mainly by 
susceptibilities to the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-Diamond illusions, which accounted 
for 10.59% of the total variance. The fifth component (E) was driven mainly by 
susceptibilities to the Oppel-Kundt and Poggendorf illusions, which accounted for 8.81% of 
the total variance. 
 
Illusion susceptibility and quotient scores using a regression-based approach 
Susceptibility to component D (r(129) = −0.26, p = .016) but not the other components (all p 
> .75) decreased as a function of AQ (Fig. 3a). For verification, we further correlated 
susceptibility to the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions with AQ and found 
that both illusions did correlate individually with AQ (Shepard’s tabletops illusion: r(129) = 
−0.20; Square-diamond illusion: r(129) = −0.18; both puncorr < .05). None of the components 
correlated with either EQ (all p > .211) or SQ (all p > .293) (Fig. 3b-c).  
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We also correlated scores from the different AQ subscales with susceptibility to 
component D (Fig. 4b-f). Imagination (r(129) = −.26, p = .014) and Communication (r(129) = 
−.23, p = .038) but not the other subscales (all p > .13) correlated negatively with this factor. 
Of particular interest, the correlation between susceptibility to component D and Attention to 
Detail was nowhere close to being significant (r(129) = −.11, p = 1) and would still not have 
reached significance had we not corrected for multiple comparisons (puncorr = .224)  
For verification, we further correlated susceptibility to the Shepard’s tabletops and 
Square-diamond illusions with the Imagination and Communication subscales of the AQ. 
Imagination correlated with the Shepard’s tabletops illusion (r(129) = −.23, puncorr = .007) but 
not the Square-diamond illusion (r(129) = −.13, puncorr = .144).  Conversely, Communication 
correlated with the Square-diamond illusion (r(129) = −.21, puncorr = .014) but not the Shepard’s 
tabletops illusion (r(129) = −.15, puncorr = .079). 
We used multiple regression analyses to determine whether or not gender contributed 
to the correlations between susceptibility to component D and the AQ scales. Gender did not 
contribute to the correlation between component D and AQ (b = .08, t(128) = 0.95, p = .342). 
Gender also did not contribute to the correlation between component D and Imagination (b 
= .04, t(128) = 0.47, p = .637) nor the one between component D and Communication (b = .10, 
t(128) = 1.14, p = .258). 
 
Discussion 
According to prevailing theories, people with ASD favour local over global elements and see 
the world more objectively (e.g., Happé & Frith, 2006; Mottron et al., 2006; Pellicano & Burr, 
2012). It then follows that susceptibility to optical illusions might diminish as autistic traits 
increase across multiple illusions that require an analysis of global structure, particularly 
those with strong between-object relational properties. In the present investigation, we used a 
principle components analysis to formulate categories of optical illusions and then 
determined which of these categories showed a reduction in susceptibility that correlated with 
autistic traits in typically developing adults. We found that only one of these components 
correlated inversely with autistic traits. This component consisted of the Shepard’s tabletops 
and Square-diamond illusions. These findings favoured our second hypothesis, which was 
based on the idea that some but not all types of global integration might be affected by the 
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presence of autistic traits. Conversely, the findings did not support our first hypothesis, which 
was based on the prevailing view that there is a preference for processing local over global 
elements as a function of autistic traits. The following questions then arise. What is unique 
about the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions? What can our findings tell us 
about autistic perceptual styles? In the ensuing discussion, we will attempt to answer these 
questions.  
 
Shape processing 
One distinguishing feature about the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions is that 
they each consist of two stimuli with the same simple shape presented at two different 
orientations. Although the version of our Jastrow illusion also consisted of two stimuli with 
the same shape presented at two different orientations, its position was misaligned and its 
shape was more complex, which is perhaps why susceptibility scores to this illusion loaded 
onto a different component with other visually complex illusions (i.e. component A). It then 
follows that global integration mediating the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond 
illusions may depend on the processing and mental rotation of simple shapes. 
Regarding shape processing, there is evidence that these abilities differ between 
children with and without ASD although the precise nature of these differences is not clear 
and requires further investigation. Grinter, Maybery, Pellicano, Badcock, & Badcock (2010) 
have shown that children with ASD performed worse on a shape discrimination task than 
appropriately matched controls. Specifically, the children with ASD required greater form 
distortion between two shapes to report a perceptual difference between them. However, 
another study from the same lab showed the reverse effect using different spatial image 
frequencies (Almeida, Dickinson, Maybery, Badcock, & Badcock, 2014). In our study, we 
did not observe any correlation between abilities in shape discrimination and autistic traits. 
This could relate to the fact that our shape matching control task was less sensitive than those 
used by Grinter et al. (2010) and Almeida et al. (2014). In addition, the effects of autistic 
traits on shape discrimination may be more pronounced in younger populations with ASD. 
Nonetheless, we think that shape processing in ASD is an important avenue for future 
research. 
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Mental rotation 
It is tempting to infer that the two stimuli in the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond 
illusions might appear more similar as a function of AQ because people with higher AQ 
scores might be better at mental rotation. At first, this appears plausible in light of the 
extreme male brain theory (Baron-Cohen, 2003) and the fact that performance on mental 
rotation has been shown numerous times to be superior in males than females (Voyer, Voyer, 
& Bryden, 1995). The extreme male brain theory of autism holds that men tend to be 
systemisers. Namely, men are more interested in patterns and are quick to spot, process, and 
manipulate patterns. In contrast, women tend to be empathisers, who are more keenly tuned 
to the emotions of others. Also, according to the theory, both men and women with ASD are 
systemisers. In agreement with the theory, it has been demonstrated that mental rotation 
performance increases with higher SQ and lower EQ scores (Cook & Saucier, 2010). 
However, in the present investigation, susceptibility to the Shepard’s tabletops and 
Square-diamond illusions did not correlate with either SQ or EQ, nor did susceptibility to 
these illusions differ as a function of gender. Thus, any possible male advantage in mental 
rotation did not diminish the strength of the two illusions. Furthermore, a multiple regression 
analysis did not yield any contributions of gender to the effects of AQ on susceptibility to the 
Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions, which further de-emphasises any possible 
male advantage in mental rotation accounting for these findings. It should be mentioned that 
the literature indicates some inconsistencies as to whether or not individuals with ASD are 
actually better at performing mental rotation relative to appropriately matched control 
subjects (Beacher et al., 2012; McGrath et al., 2012; Soulieres, Zeffiro, Girard, & Mottron, 
2011). 
 
Processing of within-object relational properties 
In several illusions we tested, the target was presented over a background or beside other 
shapes (i.e., Delboeuf, Ebbinghaus, Ehrenstein, Ponzo, and Sander’s parallelogram illusions). 
In two others, multiple local elements were presented in combination to form an overall 
Gestalt (i.e., Helmholtz-Square and Opel-Kundt illusions). In another, the target was 
presented behind another shape (i.e. Poggendorf illusion). All these illusions had local 
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elements that were physically detached from each other and can be classified as between-
object illusions.  
In contrast, the remaining illusions, consisting of the Fick, Müller-Lyer, Jastrow, 
Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions, consisted of local elements that were all 
physically attached together and can be classified as within-object illusions. Yet, some of 
these illusions may depend more strongly on within-object relational properties than others if 
one considers that the Fick and Müller-Lyer illusion still have local elements that are clearly 
distinguishable from another and that the stimuli in the Jastrow illusion are misaligned and 
have a visually complex shape that may require additional spatial processing.  
Conversely, in the case of Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamonds illusions, it is the 
processing of the various characteristics of the target stimulus (e.g., its length and width) and 
not its interaction with a contextual background or independent local elements that leads to a 
perceptual rescaling (Ben-Shalom & Ganel, 2012). The ordinary rectangle is another example 
of this type of illusion. The perceptual judgement of its width is always contingent on its 
length: Longer rectangles are typically perceived narrower than shorter rectangles with the 
same width (Ganel & Goodale, 2003; Ben-Shalom & Ganel, 2012). Likewise, in the case of 
both the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions, a change in the orientation of the 
stimulus can change its apparent length and width. Our findings indicate that this mechanism 
is less pronounced in individuals with more autistic traits. This creates a dilemma for the 
prevailing view that there is a bias for local processing as a function of autistic traits. If this 
were the case, one would predict greater degrees of reduced susceptibility to between-object 
than within-object illusions as a function of autistic traits given that the local elements are far 
more salient in the former than the latter. Our results show the exact reverse pattern of results 
that one would expect for a perceptual style favouring local elements (Sutherland & Crewther, 
2010). 
 
Earlier research on illusion susceptibility as a function of autistic traits 
Previously, Chouinard et al. (2013) published a preliminary study correlating AQ with 
susceptibility to the Ebbinghaus, Ponzo, and Müller-Lyer illusions. The authors found that 
susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer but not the Ebbinhaus and Ponzo illusions correlated 
negatively with AQ. In explaining their results, Chouinard et al. (2013) noted how the 
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contextual cues in the Ebbinghaus and Ponzo illusions were physically detached from their 
target elements whereas this was not the case in the Müller-Lyer illusion. Much as we argue 
in this paper, the authors proposed that autistic traits may not hamper global integration for 
between-object illusions.  
However, we did not replicate their result. In the present investigation, susceptibility 
to the Müller-Lyer illusion did not change as a function of AQ. We believe that this 
discrepancy may relate to one important methodological difference between our studies. 
Chouinard et al. (2013) presented their comparison and standard stimuli diagonally in the far 
opposite corners of the computer monitor whereas we presented the two stimuli closer 
together side-by-side. This could have influenced the results. We know that eye movements 
have a strong influence on susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion (e.g., de Grave & Bruno, 
2010; van Zoest & Hunt, 2011) and that people with and without ASD differ in the way they 
scan visual scenes (Pelphrey et al., 2002). It then follows that perhaps the effects on the 
Müller-Lyer illusion observed by Chouinard et al. (2013) may have been driven by 
differences in eye movement strategies in participants with higher AQ scores. 
In a different study, Walter et al. (2009) performed a principle component analysis on 
eight optical illusions (Rod-and-frame, Induced motion, Roelofs, Ponzo, Poggendorf, Zöllner, 
Ebbinghaus, and Müller-Lyer illusions). The principle component analysis returned a two 
component solution and the authors correlated the aggregated scores for each component with 
AQ, EQ, and SQ scores. The authors found that the first of the two components, consisting of 
the rod-and-frame, Roelofs, Ponzo, and Poggendorf illusions, correlated negatively with SQ. 
Both components did not correlate with AQ or EQ. Comparing the Walter et al. (2009) study 
with the present investigation reveals a number of converging and diverging findings. In 
agreement with the Walter et al. (2009) study, we did not find any correlations between 
susceptibility to the Ponzo, Poggendorf, Ebbinghaus, and Müller-Lyer illusions as a function 
of AQ or EQ. Contrary to the Walter et al. (2009) study, participants in the present 
investigation did not show reduced susceptibility to either the Ponzo or Poggendorf illusions 
as a function of SQ.  
Walter et al. (2009) argued that greater levels of systemising meant a greater focus on 
details, which in turn reduced abilities in global integration and levels of susceptibility to 
some of their illusions. However, we are skeptical about this interpretation for two reasons. 
The first is that susceptibility to the illusions did not correlate with the Attention to Detail 
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subscale of the AQ, which quantifies the degree to which a person pays attention to details 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The second is that the illusion tasks in the Walter et al. (2009) 
study varied considerably in a number of extraneous demands. For example, Walter et al. 
(2009) had the comparison stimulus presented outside of the optical illusion display for some 
illusions but not others, which could have affected how the individual illusions correlated 
with each other as well as with SQ. 
 
AQ subscales and illusion susceptibility 
The assessment of which specific subscales within the AQ correlate with illusion 
susceptibility can provide insight into which cognitive aspects associated with ASD may be 
directly related to the effects observed with overall AQ scores. The Imagination and 
Communication subscales of the AQ accounted for reduced illusion susceptibility in the 
Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions respectively. A careful examination of 
these two subscales reveals that they both assess abilities in meta-cognition, which is the 
ability to think about thinking.  
Higher scores on the Imagination subscale of the AQ indicate reduced abilities to 
imagine. Items on the subscale include: If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to 
create a picture in my mind; When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the 
characters might look like; and, When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games involving 
pretending with other children (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Higher scores on the 
Communication subscale of the AQ indicate reduced abilities to communicate with others in 
a social context and it does not imply problems in language skills. Items on this subscale tap 
into facets of theory of mind and social reciprocity with questions such as: I find it easy to 
read between the lines when someone is talking to me; I know how to tell if someone listening 
to me is getting bored; and, I am often the last to understand the point of a joke (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). It would appear that various aspects of meta-cognition may be reduced as 
a person scores higher on these two subscales.  
Thus, correlations between these subscales and susceptibility to the Shepard’s 
tabletops and Square-diamond illusions imply that the illusions depend on high level 
mechanisms of global integration. Equally important was the complete lack of correlation 
between the Attention to Detail subscale and illusion susceptibility. Taken together, 
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differences in global but not local processing seem to drive people with more autistic traits to 
become less susceptible to the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions. These 
results cannot be reconciled with the Enhanced Perceptual Functioning theory, which 
stipulates that the mechanisms of global processing are normal in ASD and that autistic 
perceptual styles are due to enhanced abilities in local processing making it possible, but 
optional, to process global structure (Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, 
Hubert, & Burack, 2006). It is also of note that Chouinard et al. (2013) and Walter et al. 
(2009) could also not find any evidence of reduced susceptibility to illusions as a function of 
the Attention to Detail subscale. 
 
Top-down influences 
If high level mechanisms of global integration are important in driving susceptibility to the 
Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions then it is highly plausible that these 
illusions also involve top-down mechanisms. Indeed, several lines of evidence are in favour 
of a top-down account. For example, Ben-Shalom & Ganel (2012) have shown in a 
psychophysics experiment how within-object illusions, similar to the Shepard’s tabletops and 
Square-diamond illusions, are immune to the effects of iconic but not visual working memory. 
In their study, participants judged the size of a probe stimulus relative to a target that 
preceded it. Illusory effects were reported when the two stimuli were presented further apart 
in time during the visual working memory condition but not when they were presented closer 
in time during the iconic memory condition.  
In addition, the Shepard’s tabletops illusion is even more pronounced when pictorial 
depth cues are added to the display, demonstrating the degree to which this illusion is driven 
by top-down mechanisms. For example, the illusion is enhanced when table legs are added 
below the parallelograms (Mitchell, Ropar, Ackroyd, & Rajendran, 2005). The longer and 
shorter legs as projected on the retina respectively specify to the brain what part of the 
tabletop is in the foreground and background. This in turn causes perceptual rescaling that 
can only be explained by top-down mechanisms given that the understanding of these depth 
cues requires conceptual processing. Similarly, texture and shading gradients specifying 
depth also enhances perceptual rescaling (Tyler, 2011).  
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Susceptibility to these different versions of the Shepard’s tabletops illusion has been 
examined in individuals with ASD. Mitchell, Mottron, Soulieres, & Ropar (2010) presented 
2D (consisting of only two parallelograms) and 3D (consisting of two parallelograms with 
legs) versions of the illusion to a cohort of individuals with ASD and a group control. 
Confirming that the illusion is driven by top-down mechanisms, both groups showed greater 
susceptibility to the 3D compared to 2D version of the illusion. In agreement with our 
findings, susceptibility to the illusion, irrespective of version, was diminished in the 
individuals with ASD. These findings are not only interesting but they are also reassuring 
because they show how the use of a normal range analogue of autistic traits to study autistic 
perception indirectly can converge to similar conclusions as studies that examine similar 
questions in individuals with ASD. 
 
Closing remarks 
An obvious limitation to the present investigation is that we did not examine ASD sample 
directly. There is no guarantee that repeating the same experiments in this population would 
yield similar results. However, the advantage of our approach is that it does not suffer from 
confounds related to differences in population samples in terms of symptom severity, 
cognitive ability, development, and co-morbid disorders. Contrary to finding a generalised 
preference for local over global processing across multiple illusions with between-object 
relationship properties, we found reduced susceptibility as a function of AQ in two within-
object illusions. These illusions consisted of the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond 
illusions, which are known to depend on within-object relational shape processing, high level 
global integration, and top-down mechanisms. We conclude by suggesting on the basis of our 
findings and other lines of evidence that these mechanisms are distinctively affected as a 
function of the autism continuum in the general population and might also be affected in 
individuals with ASD. We contend that combining the strengths of various approaches is 
required to fully understand and appreciate the subtleties of perceptual processing in ASD. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and effect size for each illusion.  
Illusion task M SD t (130) 95% CI Cohen’s d 
Delboeuf  0.08 0.08 11.78* 0.07 – 0.10 0.22 
Ebbinghaus 0.10 0.04 27.40* 0.10 – 0.11 0.29 
Ehrenstein 0.07 0.05 16.13* 0.06 – 0.08 0.22 
Fick 0.15 0.08 21.47* 0.14 – 0.17 0.34 
Helmholtz 0.14 0.06 29.26* 0.14 – 0.15 0.34 
Jastrow 0.08 0.04 21.79* 0.07 – 0.08 0.24 
Müller-Lyer 0.18 0.05 40.36* 0.17 – 0.18 0.39 
Oppel-Kundt 0.08 0.10 9.93* 0.07 – 0.10 0.21 
Poggendorf 0.09 0.03 32.06* 0.08 – 0.10 0.27 
Ponzo 0.12 0.05 27.65* 0.11 – 0.13 0.31 
Sander’s parallelogram 0.16 0.07 26.47* 0.15 – 0.18 0.36 
Shepard’s tabletops 0.22 0.06 39.96* 0.21 – 0.23 0.44 
Square-diamond 0.05 0.03 17.16* 0.04 – 0.05 0.19 
 
Asterisks (*) denote significant effects at p < .05 (two-tailed). 
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Table 2. Principal components analysis. 
Illusion task A B C D E 
Ponzo .69* .32 .11 .09 -.06 
Sander’s parallelogram .65* -.09 -.10 .07 .11 
Ehrenstein .57* -.24 .19 -.13 .39 
Jastrow .55* .15 .10 -.01 -.24 
Fick -.01 .72* .09 .16 .09 
Helmholtz .05 .63* .13 .17 -.17 
Müller-Lyer .32 .53* -.10 -.39 .26 
Delboeuf  -.04 .14 .86* -.17 .12 
Ebbinghaus .18 .06 .80* .34 -.07 
Shepard’s tabletops -.17 .24 .07 .73* .09 
Square-diamond .27 .06 -.01 .67* .07 
Oppel-Kundt -.29 -.17 -.08 .11 .70* 
Poggendorf .21 .19 .11 .05 .54* 
 
Asterisks (*) denote loading weights above a threshold of 0.4. 
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Table 3. Correlations (r) between matching control tasks and various scores.  
Matching task AQ EQ SQ A B C D E 
Shape -.02 -.10 -.17 .03 .04 .02 -.02 .09 
Size -.05 -.02 -.07 -.03 .20 .00 .02 -.01 
Orientation .16 -.09 .04 .19 -.05 -.02 -.08 -.04 
Alignment .00 .01 -.12 -.10 -.12 -.13 -.09 -.02 
Luminance .13 .06 -.03 -.05 .00 -.05 .00 .10 
 
Asterisks (*) denote significant effects at p < .05 (two-tailed). 
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Fig. 1. Optical illusions and control tasks. The figure displays the illusions and the control 
tasks that were examined in this study. The illusions consisted of the Delboeuf (a), 
Ebbinghaus (b), Ehrenstein (c), Fick (d), Helmholz square (e), Jastrow (f), Müller-Lyer (g), 
Oppel-Kuntz (h), Ponzo (i), Poggendorf (j), Sander’s parallelogram (k), Shepard’s tabletops 
(l), and square-diamond illusions (m). The control tasks consisted of size (n), shape (o), 
orientation (p), alignment (q), and luminance (r) matching tasks. For each trial, participants 
had to adjust a comparison stimulus (or a particular part of a display designated as the 
comparison feature) to appear the same along a physical dimension as a standard stimulus (or 
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a particular part of a display designated as the standard feature) by pressing buttons displayed 
on the bottom of the computer screen.  
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Fig. 2. Distributions on the quotient scores. The figure shows the distribution of AQ scores 
(a), EQ scores (b), and SQ scores (c) in the participants. These distributions were deemed to 
be normally distributed. 
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Fig. 3. Correlations for each of the different components as a function of different quotient 
scores. The bar graphs display how well each of the different components correlated with the 
AQ (a), EQ (b), and SQ (c) scores. The x-axes denote each of the components and the y-axes 
represent the Pearson correlation coefficients (r). Positive r values denote increased 
susceptibility while negative r values denote decreased susceptibility to the optical illusions 
as a function of the quotient scores. The dashed lines represent the level with which r had to 
pass in order to reach significance after a Bonferroni correction was applied (p < .05).  
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Fig. 4. Correlations between susceptibility to component D and the different subscales of 
the AQ. The figure shows how susceptibility to component D, which was largely driven by 
the Shepard’s tabletops and Square-diamond illusions, changed as a function of overall AQ 
(a) as well as how it changed as a function of the Attention to Detail (b), Attention Switching 
(c), Imagination (d), Communication (e), and Social Skill (f) subscales of the AQ. The 
negative correlations for overall AQ, Imagination, and Communication (a, d, e) show how 
participants with these higher AQ scores were less susceptible to the illusions that loaded 
onto component D. X-axes represent the scores while the y-axes represent the regression 
scores for component D arising from the principle component analyses. Pearson correlation 
coefficients (r) and the corresponding p values, corrected for multiple comparisons using the 
Bonferroni method, are marked on each graph. Results were considered significant if p < .05. 
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Supplementary Materials 
 
Illusion susceptibility and quotient scores using a median-split approach 
In addition to the regression-based approach described in the paper, we also used a median-
split approach to compare susceptibility scores on each of the different components between 
participants with low versus high scores on the AQ, EQ, and SQ. This approach turned the 
continuous variables of AQ, EQ, and SQ into categorical ones by first finding the median and 
then assigning any individual with a score below the median into the category low and any 
individual with a score above it into the category high. Individuals with a score equal to the 
median were randomly assigned to either the low or high groups. Independent samples t-tests 
were then applied to test for group differences. In contrast to the regression-based approach, 
the median-split approach did not reveal any significant findings. The median score for AQ 
was 16, the median score for EQ was 45, and the median score for SQ was 24. Independent 
samples t-tests did not show any significant differences between the low (n = 65) and high (n 
= 66) AQ groups for any of the components (all p > .279) although component D did show 
the strongest effect in the expected direction (t(129) = 1.93, puncorr = .056, Cohen’s d = .32). 
Additional independent samples t-tests did not show any significant differences between the 
low (n = 61) and high (n = 60) EQ groups for any of the components (all p > .754). Likewise, 
independent samples t-tests did not show any significant differences between the low (n = 61) 
and high (n = 62) SQ groups for any of the components (all p > .689). We attribute the lack 
of effects to a reduction in power of the median-split approach in explaining variability in the 
data relative to the regression-based approach. This issue and other limitations of the median-
split approach are discussed in much more detail elsewhere (e.g., MacCallum, Zhang, 
Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). 
 
 
Additional experiment on learning effects 
At the time we carried out the main experiment, we did not record the order of trial 
presentation, which was randomly generated by our computer program for each participant. 
Hence, another experiment repeated the same illusion tasks in a different set of participants 
so we could examine whether or not participants became better at judging the physical 
properties of a stimulus as a function of trial number. The control tasks were not considered 
in this experiment given that it was expected most participants would be fairly accurate 
across the four trials. Sixteen (7 males, age range 21-39, mean = 27.8) right-handed adults 
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meeting the same inclusion and exclusion criteria as the main experiment participated. Scores 
for each trial were calculated by taking the absolute difference between the adjusted 
comparison and the fixed standard. To ascertain whether or not participants could learn to 
more accurately judge the physical properties of the standard within the four trials allocated 
per illusion task, we entered scores for each trial in an ANOVA with Task and Trial Number 
(1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4) as within-subject factors. This analysis did not reveal any evidence of 
increased performance as a function of trial number. There was no main effect of Trial 
Number (F(3,45) = 1.48, p = .234, η
2
 = .090) nor did this factor interact with Task (F(12,180) = 
1.31, p = .111, η2 = .080). Nonetheless, there was a main effect of Task (F(12,180) = 18.36, p 
< .001, η2 = .550) driven by the differences in strength across the different illusions. 
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